Abstract: Eco-design research suggests that environmental considerations should be integrated with product development with no or only minor changes to existing development processes. These processes are expected to be systematic, predictable and thoroughly planned. This paper explores if this assumption is still valid when requirements on environmental performance call for more innovative product development. An analytic model is derived from innovation management literature and used to analyse the development of a new industrial gas turbine, a project for which challenging emission level targets meant that new combustion technology had to be applied. The main conclusion is that the application of new technology is followed by changes of the development process, meaning that development becomes guided by realtime experiences rather than by formal plans.
Introduction
The entrance of market forces requesting industry to take a broader environmental responsibility, combined with increasingly stringent environmental regulation have forced companies to consider the environment as a strategic issue. Industrial firms have responded by implementing environmental management systems and by formulating, communicating and realizing environmental strategies. Product development and innovation efforts have been frequently emphasized as vital building blocks in the realization of so called pro-active environmental strategies [1] [2] [3] .
The essence of eco-design research is to find effective and efficient ways of integrating environmental considerations in product development. During recent years, this research has resulted in a relatively broad knowledge on how to accomplish product improvements incorporating minor adjustments of established products and technologies. However more radical product changes are needed in order to reach larger environmental performance improvements. Product redesign, where the overall product structure stays the same but parts of the product are developed further or replaced by others, is the next step to be taken in the "eco-design innovation hierarchy" [4] . Recent experiences reported from Danish manufacturing firms underline this argument by pointing out that the environmentally most interesting options typically require the application of new technologies [5] . So, in order to reach beyond minor product improvements, companies need to engage in technology development and apply new technological solutions in the development of innovative products.
Eco-design literature usually states that the basic structure of the product development process does not change when environmental requirements are integrated. For example, Brezet and van Hemel [6] base their view of product development on a model originally presented by Pahl and Beitz [7] . This model describes product development as a well structured process consisting of a series of well-defined and sequential steps. Another example is Keldmann and Olesen [8] who base their work on a model presented by Andreasen and Hein [9] . This model describes product development as a systematic process consisting of a series of stages, each with a distinct purpose. After each stage, and before proceeding with the next, the project is thoroughly reviewed. According to Keldmann and Olesen [8] environmental considerations should be integrated in this process through a number of milestone questions. Using this approach, environmental issues are included in established frameworks and a pre-defined model of product development is used as a template. It is assumed that the product development process should not be elaborated or developed further.
In this paper, we raise the question whether the assumption of product development as a systematic, predictable and thoroughly planned process is still valid when requirements on environmental performance call for more innovative product development. Based on a case study of a product development project, which to a large extent was driven by challenging environmental performance targets, the paper explores the consequences for the development process when new technology is applied.
A contingency approach to product development
The management of product development has long attracted the attention of both scholars and practitioners. Lately, some researchers have suggested that there might not be a single best way to manage product development projects. Rather, the appropriate way to manage product development is dependent on contextual factors. This view of product innovation is firmly based on early findings by contingency theory scholars such as Burns and Stalker [10] and Lawrence and Lorch [11] , who argued that the structure of an organization should follow the characteristics of the situation. Applied to product development, this means that the situation should be assessed before the development process is determined. Empirical support for this contingency view of product innovation can be found in Eisenhart and Tabrizi [12] and Veryzer [13] , and complementary theoretical discussions have been presented by McKee [14] .
Eisenhart and Tabrizi [12] focused their study of product innovation in the computer industry on how firms achieve fast adaptation through short development lead-times. They contrasted two theoretical models of product development, the experiential model and the compression model. The experiential model, which was found to be generally successful in the computer industry, considers product development as an uncertain path through foggy and shifting markets and technologies. Under these circumstances it is important to quickly build understanding based on real-time experiences, while maintaining focus and motivation. This can be achieved by using multiple design iterations, extensive testing, frequent project milestones and by assigning a powerful project leader. The compression model, on the other hand, assumes a certain development process which incorporates a predictable series of well-defined steps. These steps can be rationalized and squeezed together through extensive planning, supplier involvement, use of CAD tools, multi-functional teams and overlapping development stages. The compression model was found to be successful only in mature industry segments where the designs are similar from project to project.
According to Veryzer [13] , a majority of the research on development processes so far has been directed at incremental innovation, whereas discontinuous or radical innovation has been largely ignored. In an attempt to correct this, he has analysed eight discontinuous development projects, focusing on the specific characteristics of discontinuous innovation, i.e. the development of products which involve advanced capabilities that do not exist in current products and cannot be achieved through the extension of existing technologies. His conclusion is that the characteristics of discontinuous innovations, such as the high degree of technological and/or market uncertainty, makes the development differ substantially from continuous development. While continuous product development often follows formal stage-gate processes, the development of discontinuous products is accomplished in a much more informal manner. The first phase in a discontinuous development process involves the exploration of various new technologies. Often these activities are undertaken in separate R&D laboratories in independent research programs. Product development is generally initiated by the convergence of developing technologies, various contextual factors and the vision of a strong product champion. The discontinuous development process is more exploratory and less customer driven than the continuous development. Furthermore, the prototype plays a central role throughout the process. Product design and prototyping often precede venture and market analyses. Practical tests are used to explore and formulate the technical aspects of the product at an early stage. This is necessary because a sense of the product application must be gained early in order to establish a direction for the project and identify relevant customer groups.
McKee [14] makes a theoretical contribution by relating organizational learning theories to development processes. He argues that incremental innovation must be supported by single-loop learning skills, whereas discontinuous innovation requires double-loop learning as well. Single-loop learning takes place in relation to a given set of operating norms, and applied on product development, this kind of learning requires that inter-functional contacts within the organization are encouraged. This may be achieved through project team organization and rotation of employees. In companies occupied by incremental innovation, analytical skills are often highly specific and connected with particular product technologies. Furthermore continuous innovation requires a depth of contact with a selected environment. This may be fostered by increasing the number of contacts, the velocity of the information flows and the reliability of information. Computers may be helpful for providing such an increased contact depth. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, refers to a learning activity which involves changes in operating norms or mind-sets. Such learning skills are required in situations where the technology base of the organization has to change. In these situations, inputs of external knowledge is often crucial and organizations might use mechanisms such as out-rotation and outsider involvement to gain this knowledge. Employees must be encouraged to make novel associations and linkages, the organization has to be adaptable, embrace errors and permit slack recourses.
The findings from the referred studies show that development projects which are exposed to a high degree of uncertainty have fundamentally different characteristics than development projects which are exposed to a low degree of uncertainty. In Figure 1 , these findings are synthesized into an analytic model. At each end of the uncertainty scale, opposite types of development processes can be discerned. In this paper the two opposites are denoted as Planned process and Experience-based process, respectively. Experience-based processes, on the other hand, are more informal as they are to a higher degree guided by strong visions and real-time experiences. The leadership is concentrated in one powerful project leader or product champion. Experience-based processes are largely explorative, meaning that a number of alternative solutions are tested before it is finally decided which one to go for. New knowledge is required and existing norms or mind-sets may have to be questioned and reformulated. External parties, such as independent R&D laboratories, often play important roles as sources of new knowledge. The extensive use of practical tests as a means for providing direction at an early stage is particularly striking for experience-based development processes. Both Eisenhart and Tabrizi [12] and Veryzer [13] underline that testing and prototypes are particularly important in the accomplishment of innovative product development, and support for this view can also be found elsewhere in the literature [15, 16] .
As the majority of the product development research so far has addressed product development as being a planned process, this kind of process can be seen as the present 'norm' within the product development literature [12, 13] . Thus, it is not surprising that eco-design research, as described in the introduction of this paper, usually assumes planned processes.
Research methods
The empirical data for this paper was collected in a single case study of a new product development project. The industrial company where the case study was conducted was selected according to two main criteria. Firstly, the company should apply a pro-active environmental management strategy, including an ambition to develop products with leading environmental performance. Secondly, the company should carry out intensive product development activities. The empirical data was collected using open-ended semistructured interviews in which the interviewees were asked to describe their experiences from and roles in the development project. A total of 13 interviews were made, each lasting one and a half to two hours. The interviewees included the project manager, subproject managers and engineers that have participated in the project.
The GTX 100 project
ABB STAL AB, a subsidiary within the ABB Group, develops, designs and manufactures steam turbines and gas turbines for power generation, mechanical drives and propulsion systems. In 1994, the company started the development of their newest gas turbine, the GTX 100, aiming at the 30-50 MW market segment. In the feasibility study, high reliability, efficiency and low costs, both initial cost and service costs, had been identified as important features of the new machine. Furthermore, environmental performance was becoming increasingly important on the market. ABB STAL's previous experiences with the application of the so-called EV (Environmental) burner in the smaller GT 10 machine in combination with the overall company profile made it natural to adopt a target of world class environmental performance as one of the top priorities. For a gas turbine the environmental performance is, more or less, solely related to the emissions produced during usage and the primary environmental performance indicator is the level of NOx emissions.
"If you take a combustion machine such as the gas turbine, almost independent of who the manufacturer is, the emissions contribute to so much of the environmental impact that you cannot even see the rest.
[…] It is peanuts under the circumstances" -Senior Marketing Specialist.
At this time, the major competitors in the 30-50 MW segment had NOx emission levels on 25 ppm for gaseous fuels and 42 ppm for liquid fuels. For the GTX 100 development project, the emission level targets was set well below these figures and the machine was launched with emission levels on 15 ppm for gaseous fuels and 25 ppm for liquid fuels.
Project organization
Industrial gas turbines basically consist of three core systems: a compressor which compresses air from the air inlet, a combustor where the fuel is burnt and the air is heated, and a turbine which converts the heated and compressed air into a rotation movement. Three separate functional disciplines take part in gas turbine development: aerodynamics, mechanical design and solid mechanics. Development is generally initiated by an aerodynamics engineer, who makes an overall layout based on the desired air-flows and temperature profiles, then the designer makes a drawing based on the data handed over by the aerodynamics engineer, and finally the solid mechanics engineer makes an analysis to verify the strength. This procedure is repeated a number of times until the desired properties are reached. This development procedure is relatively common for design tasks at all levels, from overall lay-out of the complete machine to detail design of individual parts.
Traditionally, development projects at ABB STAL had been organized in a fairly functional manner, emphasizing the technological performance separately and disciplinewise, but with lesser emphasis on the complete product.
"In previous projects we used to work in a very disciplinary manner. There were aerodynamics, design, solid mechanics etc. In the end, we would end up with three main disciplines in the project and from experience, it was very difficult to make these people cooperate" -Sub-project manager Design Experiences from previous development projects made the project manager realize that this project had to be organized in a new way. The matrix presented in Figure 2 illustrates the project organization. The functional disciplines of Aerodynamics, Design and Solid Mechanics were located on a horizontal line of the organizational chart, whereas the three systems, Compressor, Combustor and Turbine, were located on a vertical line of the same chart. Sub-project managers were assigned both to the functional disciplines and to the systems.
The basic idea behind this organizational structure was to ensure that high quality and performance targets were met as well as time schedules and budgets were observed. The functional managers were given the responsibility for performance and quality targets, whereas the system managers were given the responsibility for schedule attainment. This created a tension in the project, but part of the idea was to bring potential conflicts to the surface at an early stage in order to reach consensus around decisions. The project members were located according to the three systems and fundamental decisions were taken in meetings led by the system managers. The combustor and compressor development was largely conducted by engineers at ABB STAL in Sweden, whereas major parts of the turbine development were assigned to Uniturbo, a design office in Moscow which during the course of the project was acquired by the ABB Group. Cross-functional teams
Project stages
The GTX 100 project was not planned according to a previously defined project model. Rather the project management team started from scratch, developing and applying a tailor made model of the process. Apart from the initial feasibility study, four separate stages were distinguished in the complete project: concept stage, design stage A, design stage B (detailed design) and evaluation stage. The feasibility study, as described above, was common for all product sub-systems and it resulted in a product specification. The second stage, the concept design, started when the development project got formal approval from top management. Design stages A and B incorporated the bulk of the product development work. Design stage A started when the concept designs of the subsystems, respectively, were approved and frozen. Design stage B (detail design) started when the project got approval to place orders with the suppliers to start manufacturing parts for the first machine. The evaluation stage incorporated final validation and verification.
Since the work with the compressor system mostly consisted of down-scaling of an existing compressor which initially had been developed for a larger machine in a previous project, the remainder of the case description will focus on the combustor and turbine development. The development efforts within the GTX 100 project were to a large extent concentrated on these systems.
Do things at the right time
(responsible for schedule)
New technology and an intensive test scheme in the combustor development
The targets on low NOx emission levels, combined with the targets set for efficiency, could not be reached by refinements of the combustor system used in existing machines. A completely new design, including a new burner and a new combustion chamber, had to be developed. The development of new burner technology had been initiated at ABB Corporate Research in Switzerland, a research laboratory which is common for the ABB Power Generation business unit, but this development had been done in a laboratory environment. The new burner technology was developed as a generic technology which was to be applied in different machines. The development of a new combustor based on the new burner was considered a big step. The technology development was not completed when the GTX 100 project started, thus resulting in a high level of technological uncertainty. The concept design stage of the combustor system was relatively long in duration since a number of different building concepts were discussed and tried. This meant that the design stages started relatively late compared to other sub-systems. Because of the new technology, no reliable mathematical models were available for the calculation of the combustor system behaviour. Instead the combustor development had to rely on practical tests. Apart from securing the function of the new burner, the aim of the tests were to verify the low emission levels and to measure important parameters for the complete combustor system. The test series consisted of five consecutive test levels:
• Tests in Switzerland on the burner at lower pressures
• Tests in Germany on the burner at full operating pressures
• Tests in Sweden in a combustion chamber environment at atmospheric pressures
• Tests in Russia in a combustion chamber at full pressures and machine like conditions • Full-scale prototype tests in Sweden at first customer In the initial tests the function and emission levels were successfully verified and the temperature profile for the combustion chamber was mapped out. However during the tests in Russia, which were conducted at the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM), a technological problem occurred due a phenomena which had been underestimated. It was necessary to develop more knowledge about this, and to extend both the analysis and testing in this area. A cooperation program was initiated in order to solve the problem and the extensive experiences of the CIAM engineers became very helpful in the problem-solving process. Initially, ABB STAL had just intended to use the test facility for the combustor system tests. The combustion technology expertise of CIAM was not considered relevant. However, during the initial cooperation ABB STAL realized that CIAM's competence in combustion technology was very valuable. In consecutive test rounds CIAM engineers were given comprehensive responsibility for test model designs, test programs, instrument equipment and evaluation procedures. Subsequently, the cooperation with CIAM became a matter for the entire ABB power generation business unit. Seminars were held to gain knowledge and learn more about combustion technology.
Although the matrix organization was established to locate the responsibilities for time to the system sub-project managers and performance and quality to the functional sub-project managers, the sub-project manager for the combustor system adopted a role including all three responsibilities.
"He [the combustor sub-project manager] has felt responsibility for everything, including time and quality as well as technology. He felt that now I have been assigned the responsibility for the combustion chamber, I have to manage it" -Project manager.
The sub-project manager adopted a relatively comprehensive project management. He took full responsibility for coordinating and prioritizing activities and following up the results of the combustor development.
Schedule in focus for the turbine development
The turbine system development also possessed a number of technological challenges but the development was more concentrated to the enhancement of existing technology. The lead time was a critical aspect in the turbine development since it takes a long time to manufacture turbine blades. Due to long times for delivery of raw material, the time required for manufacture of moulds and the complex machining, the manufacturing takes nearly two years. To be able to stick to the time schedule, project work had to be done concurrently between the design and manufacturing of the turbine blades. Because of the complexity of casting and machining the blades the suppliers had to develop their own processes. Therefore, cooperation with the suppliers was established at an early stage of the project.
"The manufacturing will affect the designs. If you finish a design and then hand it over to a manufacturer he can't make it. Then you are back to square zero again. Therefore, you have to do it in parallel. You have to start the manufacturing process early. It took them [the manufacturers] almost a year to develop their processes" -Sub-project manager Aerodynamics
The casting was made by the British company Howmet Ltd. and the machining was made by the British Vickers Ltd. and the ABB STAL subsidiary in Ludvika, Sweden. The cooperation between the parties was coordinated and controlled by a small core team at ABB STAL. During the project regular meetings were held. When the project was in its most intensive stage, project meetings were held every second month. At these meetings 10-15 persons participated representing all parties. Having representatives for all parties meant that decisions could be made more or less immediately, thus reducing unnecessary time delays.
In the development of the turbine system, computer aid was extensively used to make the process efficient. Computers were used for strength and stress analyses as well as for simulation of aerodynamic features. In previous projects a 2D CAD system had been used, but it was decided that the new machine was to be designed with a 3D CAD. The major advantage with the shift was that it promoted efficiency in the cooperation between design and solid mechanics by making it possible for solid mechanics engineers to make calculations based on 3D models handed over from the designers. With the old CADsystem, the solid mechanics engineer had to make a new model, a time consuming process which caused delays in the design procedure. Moreover, computer aid was also used in the communication with the suppliers. Manufacturing specifications of turbine components were sent to the manufacturers in software format, i.e. as CAD-models.
The sub-project manager was replaced during the project and therefore, the way the turbine development was run differed slightly during the project. However, the subproject manager who took over when contact was to be set up with the suppliers adopted the sub-project manager role completely as intended in the initial project organization, i.e. he focused very hard on time and cost issues.
Characteristics of the development processes
Both planned and experience-based development process characteristics can be found in the GTX 100 development project. Both the turbine and combustor sub-projects followed to some degree systematic stage-gate processes, including feasibility study, concept design, design, detail design and evaluation. However, there were differences between the sub-projects concerning the length of the individual development stages, respectively. The most distinct differences concerned the concept stage. This stage was relatively short and straightforward in the turbine development, whereas a number of different conceptual solutions were thoroughly discussed and tried in the combustor development.
Initially, the project manager had the ambition to set up a comprehensive plan for the project, describing the development in detail and using this plan to manage the complete project in a systematic manner. However, it was soon found out that this plan would be too complex and difficult to use. Gradually the project management team realized that schedules should be dealt with on a sub-project level rather than on a comprehensive project level and that detailed schedules had to be based on shorter planning horizons. These plans were generally based on deadlines and it became the responsibility of the sub-project managers to ensure that these deadlines were followed. In practice, the turbine sub-project manager focused harder on these deadlines than his combustor colleague. In the combustor development, the next generation burners were introduced in order to realize the ambitious environmental performance targets. Thus, the functionality of the combustor system, comprising the new technology, had to be verified first of all. Therefore, the combustor system manager monitored the functionality and the quality related achievements rather than the scheduled deadlines.
CAD was extensively used both in the turbine and the combustor development. However, the turbine development relied more on computer assistance than the combustor development. Calculations, simulations and FEM-analyses based on mathematical models was critical for the turbine development. The combustor development on the other hand comprised new technology for which no reliable mathematical models were available and therefore this development rather had to rely on practical tests. An extensive test series, starting with tests in Switzerland and ending with the full-scale prototype tests in Sweden, was a central part of the development process and this test series involved some fundamental milestones for the combustor development.
The turbine development included deep involvement by the suppliers, which were selected at an early stage. The reason for involving the suppliers in the product development was to secure that manufacturability was considered early in the design work, thus avoiding unnecessary re-work at later stages. It should be noted that the involvement of the suppliers considered only manufacturing aspects, design tasks were not assigned to the suppliers. The overlap between detail design and production was considerable in the turbine development. In the combustor development there was some overlap between the technology development performed by ABB Corporate Research and the concept design at ABB STAL, but the overlap was not significant.
The project relied on extensive inputs from external sources. All external input to the turbine development was anticipated and carefully planned. A major part of the turbine design was performed by Uniturbo engineers and the turbine blade supplier also contributed significantly to the development. In the combustor development, ABB Corporate Research in Switzerland provided a major input as they developed the new generic burner technology. Also CIAM provided invaluable input by providing technological assistance during the combustor chamber tests. The contributions from CIAM were not anticipated from the beginning. From ABB STAL's point of view the collaboration can be interpreted as a double loop learning process. Initially, the aircraft turbine experiences of CIAM were not regarded relevant for ABB STAL's purposes but this assumption had to be re-considered when problems occurred during the tests. Eventually the assistance from CIAM became valuable for ABB STAL and invaluable for a successful completion of the combustor development.
Following the initial project organization, project management was considered more of a team work than a one man show. Many of the project management tasks were allocated to the sub-project leaders. For the individual system developments this meant that the leadership was to be an interplay between the system manager, being responsible for schedule attainment, and the functional managers who were responsible for quality issues. In the turbine development this management principle worked more or less according to plan, as the system manager identified deadlines and put time pressure on the designers, whereas the functional managers continuously followed up the quality achievements. The combustor system manager, on the other hand, felt that he had to take a broader responsibility, including both quality and time issues, in order to make sure that the development went in the right direction. The combustor system development also comprised a 'new' technological area, combustion technology, which the traditional functions (aerodynamics, design and solid mechanics) did not fully cover. Combustion technology became a natural extension of the combustor system manager's responsibilities. Although he was not an expert in the area, he had to make sure that the project absorbed the combustion technology expertise which was required for the accomplishment of the project.
In Table 1 , the similarities and differences between the development processes of the turbine and combustor systems are summarized.
As evident from Table 1 , there are significant differences between the characteristics of the combustor system development process, comprising the application of new technology, and the turbine system development process, which to a larger extent was based on established technology. The combustor was developed using a process that can be described as experience-based, whereas the turbine was to a larger extent developed according to a planned process. This was made possible through a high degree of decentralization of the project management. Since the individual sub-projects ran relatively autonomously, the development processes could be adapted according to the specific conditions of the individual sub-projects. Table 1 The GTX 100 project and development process characteristics 
Conclusion
Companies adopting pro-active environmental strategies will seek competitive advantages by developing products with superior environmental performance. Thus, the adoption of such a strategy comprise an imperative for product development to engage in innovative development activities. In the case study project, the challenging targets on low emission levels meant that new technology had to be applied and this resulted in a relatively high degree of uncertainty. The analysis revealed that the sub-project which was particularly exposed to this uncertainty, the combustor development, followed a different development process than the more 'certain' turbine development. Thus, we conclude that if challenging environmental performance targets are established, meaning that new technology has to be developed and applied, this may require a shift in the way product development is managed. Therefore, the assumption of product development as being a systematic, predictable and thoroughly planned process may not be valid if ecodesign research takes the step from studying minor product improvement to the study of major technological innovation. In order to facilitate the step towards more innovative product development, technological changes in response to environmental requirements must be allowed to affect the development process per se. Otherwise, the efforts will remain on the most basic level of eco-design innovation, i.e. minor product improvements.
In eco-design research this problem can be addressed in (at least) two different ways. Either it is assumed that environmental considerations are differentiated from product development. This approach essentially means that eco-design researchers regard product development as a 'black box' and that the essence of eco-design is to provide support for development projects, foremost in the process of setting environmental performance targets. Or alternatively, it is assumed that environmental considerations are an integrated part of product development. Using this approach means that eco-design becomes more of a facilitator of process changes than a provider of environmental expertise. Whereas the first approach will rely much on traditional environmental management tools such as life cycle assessments, the second approach means that eco-design researchers will have to broaden the frame of reference in order to fully understand the problems associated with product innovation. Both approaches may indeed be required in order to investigate how companies can accomplish environmental performance improvements, but since our research point out that changes of the development process may be necessary for taking the step towards more innovative product development, we consider this second approach to be promising. However, this issue is open to further discussion and essentially it is a positioning which each eco-design researcher has to do individually.
Managerial implications and future research
From a managerial perspective, the move towards experience-based development processes means accepting that product development becomes less predictable and more explorative; that detailed planning becomes less viable and that the projects to a larger extent have to be guided by real-time experiences. Thus, the planning horizons become shorter; development teams must be prepared to change direction if necessary, be able to absorb new knowledge and be open for reconsideration of established assumptions. Often, new knowledge has to be absorbed from external sources and therefore links to external organizations becomes more enhanced. Practical tests and prototypes are central throughout such processes and they are particularly important at early development stages in order to secure the function of new technologies and agree on new concepts. Consequently, in response to the higher degrees of uncertainty, product development organizations need to 'open up' and become more flexible. A different development process also means that the project management has to be different. Integrative efforts are required in order to achieve control, direction and clarity in development projects. When planned processes are practised, extensive planning is used for this purpose; experience-based processes, on the other hand, are integrated through visionary targets and a concentration of the leadership.
The broad categorization of development processes made in this paper is a useful tool for pointing out fundamental differences between the processes behind different kinds of innovations. However, the purpose has not been to present two categories of product development which are mutually exclusive. Rather it has been to present a model which can be used for an analytic purpose and relative comparisons. The case study illustrates that since different parts of a project organization may be exposed to different degrees of uncertainty, one single project can comprise fundamentally different development processes. This makes the task of coordinating the project very difficult. Most likely this is a general problem for complex development projects in which new technology is applied to specific sub-systems or components, whereas other parts of the product are based on established and well-known technologies. The coordination between development activities which are exposed to different degrees of uncertainty is an interesting area which is open for further research.
Development processes have been focused in this paper, but the implications of our research go further than the management of individual development projects. As illustrated in the case study, environmental demands may alter the technology base upon which firms compete. Before the environmental demands became a reality for the industrial gas turbine manufacturers, combustion technology was considered an area of marginal interest. Efficiency, which was the main performance measure, was determined by aerodynamics rather than by combustion technology expertise. With today's strong focus on emission levels, as well as efficiency, combustion technology has become one of the core technologies of the industrial gas turbine and deep knowledge in this area is a prerequisite for being able to develop competitive products. This change pattern may be compared to similar changes in other mature industry segments. For example in the auto industry, established core technologies such as the all steel body and the internal combustion engine are being called into question due to increasingly stringent environmental demands [17] . New technologies such as light-weight materials and alternative power train configurations are gaining acceptance and this development may have profound effects on the competitive basis within the auto industry in the future. Further research is required to extend the results presented in this paper and provide additional implications directed to the strategic technology management function of the organization.
